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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the commentary on U.S. immigration issues has
operated under the assumption that immigrants are enjoying
greater protection under the current immigration laws. This
assumption, however, is simply false. Historically, immigrants
have been disenfranchised due to their limited legal rights. In
1980, District Court Judge James Lawrence King condemned the
U.S. government's Haitian policy in Haitian Refugee Center v.
Civiletti.2 Eighteen years later, not much has changed. In 1997,
Judge King faced a similar challenge in Tefel v. Reno.3 On
appeal, Tefel effectively led to the reformation of the Illegal
2. Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla., 1980),
modiefied sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B
1982). For a vigorous critique of United States policy toward Haitians, see Cheryl Little,
United States Haitian Policy: A History Of Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
269 (1993).
3. Tefel v. Reno, 996 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
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Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA). The reformation of the IIRIRA reflects the long-
standing, invidious approach toward immigrants in this country.
In response to the Attorney General's vacatur of In re N-J-B,
which is a decision that applied the IIRIRA retroactively to
Nicaraguan immigrants, the Nicaraguan Adjustment and
Central American Relief Act (NACARA) was passed. 4  On
November 19, 1997, President William Jefferson Clinton signed
NACARA as part of the District of Columbia Appropriations bill,
which grants amnesty and residence to Nicaraguans and
Cubans. NACARA rewrites IIRIRA to create an exception for
certain qualifying aliens to apply for relief absent retroactive
application.5  However, NACARA treats other immigrants
similarly situated, such as Haitians, Hondurans, Malaysians,
and Iranians, among others, unequally because it excludes them
from receiving the same relief under the Act.
In In re N-J-B-, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
determined that an alien is ineligible for suspension of
4. The Board of Immigration Appeals in In re N.J-B- (which stands for Matter of
Norma de Jesus Baldizon) decided that the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) accurately interpreted § 309(c)(5) of IIRIRA and correctly applied the statute
retroactively to Nicaraguans whose cases were in the pipeline. In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec.
3309 (BIA Feb. 20, 1997); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 309(c)(5), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) [hereinafter URIRA].
Respondent's counsel never had an opportunity to argue the issue prior to the Board of
Immigration Appeals' decision and only subsequently raised it as a cause of action in the
complaint. Interview with Ira J. Kurzban, Kurzban Kurzban Weinger and Tetzeli, P.A_
in Miami, Fla. (Nov. 11, 1997). On appeal, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida in Tefel v. Reno granted a preliminary injunction which
prevented the deportation of thousands of Nicaraguans. Tefel v. Reno, 996 F. Supp. 1
(S.D. Fla. 1998).
5. Appellants' Motion For Second Extension of Time To Respond To Appellees'
Motion To Dismiss Appeal As Moot at 4, Tefel v. Reno, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING (S.D. Fla.
June 24, 1997) [hereinafter Appellants' Motion for Second Extension]. NACARA, §
203(a)(1), rewrites IIRIRA § 309(c)(5) to make it clear that former § 309(c)(5) will apply
retroactively to the cases of aliens who have been issued orders to show cause before, on,
or after IIRIRA's September 30, 1996 enactment date. Id. NACARA § 203(a)(1) creates
an exception for certain qualifying Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Eastern Europeans.
Id. The exception allows these aliens to apply for either suspension of deportation or
cancellation of removal without having their period of continuous physical presence cut
off when placed in deportation proceedings. Id. NACARA § 202 provides an amnesty
provision for Nicaraguans and Cubans. It allows Nicaraguans (and Cubans) an
opportunity to bypass the suspension process altogether and apply directly for
adjustment of status. Id. As such, under this provision, any Nicaraguan or Cuban who
has been physically present in the United States since at least December 1, 1995, and
who is otherwise admissible and applies prior to April 1, 2000, is eligible to have his
status adjusted to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Id. at 5-6.
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deportation relief even though she applied before IIRIRA.6 The
retroactive application of the statute effectively stripped the
class members of equal treatment under the Act. Subsequently,
the District Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the
class members from being deported. As a result, the Attorney
General vacated the Ia re N-J-B-7 decision and prompted
Congress to institute legislative reform. Ironically, NACARA,
the reform law, has raised the questions of preferential
treatment of other immigrants similarly situated. 8 At the same
time, NACARA did not address the jurisdictional challenges
currently being leveled against the class members at the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
This Case Note examines the history of immigration law. It
analyzes how Tefel led to the enactment of the historic
legislation by analyzing the arguments which sparked these
issues. This Case Note also addresses the jurisdictional
challenge that is the subject of the government's appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Tefel. As such, the
federal courts are faced with a fundamental question of first
impression in Tefel. Under the newly-enacted IIRIRA, the
question remains: did IIRIRA eliminate the District Courts' long-
standing jurisdiction to challenge illegal immigration? This
Comment seeks to examine the District Court's decision in Tefel
6. The decision construed IIRIRA § 309(c)(5) so as to make a number of aliens,
including class members, ineligible for the relief of suspension of deportation under § 244
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. 3309 (BIA Feb. 20,
1997); Immigration Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (1994)) [hereinafter INA]. In effect,
NACARA § 203(a)(1) reinstates and affirms the BIA's decision in In re N-J-B-. It
provides that for determining eligibility for suspension of deportation, the period of
continuous physical presence is to be cut off for aliens who have been issued an order to
show cause regardless of when the order was served. In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. 3309 (BIA
Feb. 20, 1997). For an explanation of the exceptions provided under NACARA, see
Appellants' Motion For Second Extension, supra note 5, at 3.
7. Reno Vacates N-J-B. Suspension Decision, Proposes Changes to 1996 Act, 74
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1072 (July 14, 1997).
8. Despite these reforms, the new legislation does not address Haitians similarly
situated to Nicaraguans, Cubans, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans. See Carol Rosenberg,
Proyecto Daria Residencia a Hondurefios [Project would grant residency to Hondurans],
NuEvo HERALD, Jan. 30, 1998, at 3A. What appears disguised as a giant step towards
ending the threat of immediate deportation for thousands of Central American
immigrants, is actually a major setback for Haitians. The legislation provides lesser
benefits for any other category of people included in the bill and completely excludes
Haitian, Malaysian, Honduran and Iranian immigrants who are in the same situation.
Id. Thus, imperative is the task of understanding the legal quagmire surrounding this
complex issue.
[Vol. 29:3596
IMMIGRATION REFORM
in light of the new legislation, NACARA, and the pending appeal
at the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Despite the
prospects of new legislation to reform IIRIRA, the author argues
that the impact of the legislation and the jurisdictional issue in
Tefel remain in flux, thereby creating greater uncertainty that
IIRIRA will be fairly applied. 9
II. HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION LAW
Suspension of deportation is a form of rehef that was
available in the past for immigration proceedings.' 0  The
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) establishes the
qualifications for suspension of deportation." The INA permits
the Attorney General to suspend deportation of an otherwise
deportable alien who has been present in the United States for
at least seven years, has good moral character, and whose
deportationwould result in extreme hardship to the alien or to
his spouse, parent or child, who is a citizen of the United States."
This form of relief was eliminated for all persons placed in
removal proceedings after April 1, 1997, by an immigration
reform law passed September 1996, known as IIRIRA.12
This new immigration law sparked conflicting
interpretations of various provisions affecting suspension of
deportation cases.13 Among the provisions at issue is Section
309(c)(5). This section raises the issue whether a person who is
served with an Order to Show Cause (OSC) before she has been
in the United States for seven years automatically has her
physical presence cut off, thereby making her ineligible for relief
from suspension. Tefel raised the other issue regarding whether
9. Specifically, the prospects of NACARA remain speculative until the issue of
unequal treatment for similarly situated immigrants is resolved at the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit. It has been suggested that if the Court of Appeals fails to
recognize the constitutional rights of immigrants that the Supreme Court surely will.
Nicaraguans Get Help, MiAMI HERALD, Feb. 11, 1997, at 14A. See infra Part Ifl.A & C.
10. See generally INA § 244A.
11. The INA reads in pertinent part:
To be eligible for suspension of deportation, [an] alien must prove: (1)
continuous physical presence in [the] United States for the immediately
preceding 7 years, (2) good moral character, and (3) extreme hardship to
himself or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is [a] United States citizen or
lawful permanent resident. INA § 240A.
12. See generally IIRIRA.
13. See generally In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. 3309 (BIA Feb. 20, 1997).
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Section 309(c)(5) of IIRIRA applied retroactively to individuals
who were issued an OSC prior to the new law's enactment.
A. Suspension of Deportation Not Bar Under IIRIRA
IIRIRA significantly amended the INA14 by replacing
deportation and exclusion proceedings with removal
proceedings. 15 Under IIRIRA, suspension of deportation was
replaced with a new form of relief called "cancellation of
removal." To obtain a cancellation of removal an applicant must
satisfy additional and more stringent requirements than were
previously required to gain suspension of deportation.16 One of
the new requirements is that the applicant must have been
continuously "physically present" in the United States for at
least ten years before applying for the relief.17 INA Section 240
also provides that a person who enters the United States will be
placed in removal proceedings by the issuance of an OSC. In
contrast, suspension of deportation only requires physical
presence for seven years.18 Also, in order to obtain cancellation
of removal, an applicant must prove exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to his family members who are either U.S.
citizens or lawful permanent residents. 19 Under the suspension
standard, the applicant is permitted to show extreme hardship
to himself and to his resident family.20
The right to cancellation of removal is cut off if the
immigrant attempting to accrue the ten years physical presence
is served with a charging document now called a "notice to
appear."21 IIRIRA Section 240A(d)(1), reads in pertinent part:
(1) Termination of Continuous Period.-For purposes of this
section, any period of continuous residence or continuous
14. See generally IIRIRA. The amendments relevant to Tefel took effect on April 1,
1997. Tefel v. Reno, 996 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
15. INA § 240A.
16. INA § 240A(b); see also Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference on H.R. 2202, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828, available in 104 CONG. REc.
10841, 10896 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1996) and 1996 WL 563320 [hereinafter Joint
Explanatory Statement].
17. INA § 240A(b).
18. INTRODUCING THE 1996 IMMIGRATION REFORM ACT 49 (R. Murphy ed.) (1996).
19. INA § 240A(b).
20. Id.
21. IIRIRA § 240A(d)(1).
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physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end
when the alien is served a notice to appear under section
239(a) or when the alien has committed an offense referred to
in section 212(a)(2) that renders the alien inadmissible to the
United States under section 212(a)(2) or removable from the
United States under section 237(a)(2) or 237(a)(4), whichever
is earliest.22
This is a significant departure from prior immigration law
on suspension of deportation, which was not interpreted to mean
that the seven years needed for suspension could be cut off if the
person was served with an OSC.23 However, In re N-J-B-
reinterpreted IIRIRA Section 309(c)(5) to provide that it would
apply retroactively to cut off the right to apply for suspension to
anyone served with an OSC even if a person has acquired seven
years presence in the United States. 24
B. The New Transition Rules
The "transition rule" of IIRIRA Section 309(c)(5) provides
that most of the provisions of Subtitle A of Title III take effect on
April 1, 1997.25 However, Section 309 establishes four exceptions
to the transition rule. 26 First, Section 303(b)(2) applies when the
Attorney General notifies Congress of insufficient detention
space for detainees and invokes the transition provisions.
27
Second, Section 306(c) deals with judicial review in certain
cases. 28 Third, Sections 308(d)(2)(D) and 308(d)(5) address the
issue of conforming amendments. 29 Fourth, there is an effective
date transitional rule for aliens in deportation or exclusion
proceedings on April 1, 1997.30
22. Id.
23. Interview with Ira J. Kurzban, supra note 4.
24. Id.
25. IIRIRA § 309(c)(5) reads: "(5) TRANSITIONAL RULE WITH REGARD TO
SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION. -Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 240A(d) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (relating to continuous residence or physical presence)
shall apply to notices to appear issued before, on, or after the date of the enactment of
this Act." IIRIRA § 309(c)(5).
26. Summary of Section 309 (visited Oct. 24, 1997) <http://www.fedpub.com/
immigration/docs/Sec309.html>.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Despite these new changes in the law, deportation and
exclusion proceedings that were pending before April 1, 1997,
were not altered. 1  Therefore, suspension of deportation
proceedings that were ongoing prior to April 1, 1997, and that
the government did not elect to terminate and reinitiate as
proceedings under the removal provisions 32 fall under the
transition rule. Section 309(c)(1) provides:
GENERAL RULE THAT NEW RULES DO NOT APPLY-
Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection, in the
case of an alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings
as of the title III-A effective date [April 1, 1997]-(A) the
amendments made by this subtitle shall not apply, and (B) the
proceedings (including judicial review thereof) shall continue
to be conducted without regard to such amendments. 33
However, the transition rules permit the government to
apply new procedures to pending cases in two situations.8 4 First,
the new procedures may be applied if an evidentiary hearing has
not commenced as of April 1, 1997. 35 Second, the government
may also terminate proceedings under the old law where no final
administrative decision has been entered and reinitiated under
the new law.3 6  Moreover, Sections 309(c)(4) establishes
transitional rules for judicial review of final orders of exclusion
or deportation entered into "more than 30 days after" the
enactment date of the Act which is April 1, 1997.37
In addition, Section 309(c)(5) provides a transitional rule for
suspension of deportation cases.38  It provides that the
government's service of a charging document ends the period of
continuous physical presence required for suspension of
deportation or the new cancellation of removal for "notices"
issued before, on or after September 30, 1996. 39 Thus, this
section was meant to apply exclusively to notices to appear as
opposed to orders to show cause. Specifically, IIRIRA Section
31. IIRIRA § 309(c)(1).
32. IIRIRA § 240A(b).
33. IIRIRA § 309(c)(1).
34. See generally HRIRA § 309(c)(2) and § 309(c)(3).
35. IIRIRA § 309(c)(2).
36. IIRIRA § 309(c)(3).
37. IIRIRA § 309(c)(4).
38. IIRIRA § 309(c)(5).
39. IIRIRA § 309(c)(4).
600 [Vol. 29:3
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309(c)(5) states that it "shall apply to notices to appear issued
before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act."
40
C. Legislative History
The legislative history of IIRIRA reveals that it was
Congress' intent that only service of a notice to appear under
Section 239(a) ends physical presence.4 1 IIRIRA is the fruit of
compromise between opposing legislative factions holding
different views regarding the new immigration laws.
An analysis of IIRIRA's legislative history should begin with
H.R. 2022, which was introduced into the House of
Representatives as Section 309(c)(5). 42 It read: "the period of
continuous physical presence under [section 244(a)] shall be
deemed to have ended on the date the alien was served an order
to show cause pursuant to section 242A of such Act (as in effect
before such date of enactment)."43
Subsequently, the language of Section 309(c)(5) was
amended to intentionally delete the language stating that service
of an OSC ended physical presence." The new amendment
provides: "Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 240A(d) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (relating to continuous
. ..physical presence) shall apply to notices to appear issued after
the date of the enactment of this Act. '45
While the amendment references Section 240A(d), which
applies the special transitional rules to cancellation of removal
and suspension of deportation, the original version of Section
309(c)(5) made no reference to Section 240A(d) regarding the
issuance of an OSC.
Moreover, the House Judiciary Committee Report provides
further confirmation of the amendment's intended effect upon
Section 309(c)(5). The House's interpretation of Section 309(c)(5)
40. IIRIRA § 309(c)(5) (emphasis added).
41. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law In Support Of Request For Preliminary
Injunction at 26, Tefel v. Reno, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING (S.D. Fla. June 24, 1997)
[hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum].
42. Opening Brief of Petitioner at 33, In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. 3309 (BIA Feb. 20,
1997) [hereinafter Opening Briefi.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Opening Brief, supra note 42, at 34.
45. Id. (citing H.R. 2022, § 309(c)(5)).
1998] 601
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was that: "The rules under new section 240A(d)(1) and (2)... shall
apply to any notice to appear (including an order to show cause
under current section 242A) issued after the date of enactment of
this Act."'
Thus, the final text of Section 309(c)(5) eliminated the
originally proposed language. The original language required
that service of an OSC would have ended physical presence and
instead substituted the language that applies the Section
240A(d) special rules in all cases commenced prior to April 1,
1997. Specifically, physical presence can only be terminated by
the special rules in specific situations explained by the
Conference Committee's Explanatory Statement:
The period of continuous...physical presence ends when an
alien is served a notice to appear under section 239(a) (for the
commencement of removal proceedings under section 240), or
when the alien is convicted of an offense that renders the alien
deportable from the United States, whichever is earliest. A
period of continuous physical presence is broken if the alien
has departed from the United States for any period of 90 days,
or for periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days.47
In contrast, the government asserts that the Conference
Committee:
Re-inserted language into [Section] 309(c)(5) that gave
retroactive effect to the cut off date for suspension
applications.. .this provision, which like the provision
originally contained [in] H.R. 1915 applies the cut off period
for calculation of physical presence retroactivity to all aliens
served with an order to show cause prior to enactment of the
Act ....4
However, the government's interpretation ignores the fact that
the final statutory language is substantially different from that
introduced in H.R. 1915 and 2202.49
In addition, the testimony of Peter Deutsch, a member of the
U.S. House 'of Representatives from District 20 in the state of
46. H.R. REP. No. 104-469(l) (1996), available in 1996 WL 168955.
47. Joint Explanatory Statement, supra note 16.
48. Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 26.
49. Id.
[Vol. 29:3
IMMIGRATION REFORM
Florida, challenges the government's analysis.50 Congressman
Deutsch testified that the government's interpretation of the
contemplated legislation was erroneous. 51
Therefore, the legislative history of the special rules clearly
indicates that physical presence ends upon service of a "notice to
appear under [Sjection 239(a)," commencing removal
proceedings, not when an OSC commences deportation
proceedings.
D. In re N-J-B-
1. The Facts
In Nicaragua, petitioner, Norma de Jesus Baldizon,
supported her four children by working as a schoolteacher for
twenty years.5 2  Baldizon was forced to teach Sandinista
propaganda and ideology directly against her own political
beliefs.58 Her refusal to teach these subjects caused her and her
family to suffer from harassment and scrutiny at the hand of the
Sandinista government.5 4
Fearing for her life, Baldizon left Nicaragua and legally
entered the United States with a tourist visa on April 5, 1987.55
If deported to Nicaragua, she will not be able to receive the
medical treatment she requires.5 6 As a result of overstaying her
visa, she was placed in deportation proceedings.5 7
50. Id. at 26.
51. Id. at 27. Deutsch stated that:
Our feeling was that the interpretation by the Board was an incorrect
interpretation. I'm someone who actually voted for the legislation, but I don't
think really anyone contemplated that the legislation would have specifically
changed the issue of suspension .... I don't think anyone who voted on this
legislation contemplated the effect of the ruling .... If this was something that
Congress wanted to occur we wouldn't be debating this issue now. It would
have been expressed much more clearly in the legislation.
Id. at 27.
52. Opening Brief, supra note 42, at 6-7.
53. Id. at 7.
54. id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Baldizon was issued an OSC on August 27, 1993.61 She has
been physically and continuously present in the United States
since that date. 59 At a hearing held on April 1, 1994, the judge
denied Baldizon's applications for asylum, withholding of
deportation, suspension of deportation, and voluntary
departure. 60 Instead, she was ordered deported from the United
States.6 1 Baldizon appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), which issued its 7-5 decision on February 20, 1997.62 The
Board determined that even though Baldizon had been in the
United States for almost ten years at the time it heard her case,
she was ineligible for suspension of deportation because she was
served with an OSC.63 Concurrently, Baldizon filed a protective
notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
on March 19, 1997.64 On March 28, 1997, a verified class action
complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida styled Roberto Tefel, et al. v. Janet
Reno, Attorney General, et al.65 On May 20, 1997, U.S. District
Court Judge King entered a temporary restraining order against
the government. 66 Subsequently, the government filed a motion
to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 67
The district court issued a preliminary injunction in Tefel on
June 24, 1997, and rejected the government's Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Jurisdiction. 68 The plaintiff class filed a Motion to
Dismiss the government's appeal from the district court's
preliminary injunction, on the ground that the appeal was
moot.69 Trial was set to commence at the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit on January 5, 1998, pending congressional
58. Opening Brief, supra note 42, at 7.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See generally IIRIRA.
62. Opening Brief, supra note 42, at 7.
63. Id.
64. Respondent's Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion to Reconsider, In re N-
J-B-, Int. Dec. 3309 (BIA Feb. 20, 1997).
65. Opening Brief, supra note 42, at 4.
66. TRO Granted in One Suspension Case, Motion to Dismiss Denied in Another, 74
INTERPRETER RELEASES 825 (May 19, 1997) [hereinafter TRO Granted].
67. Supplement to Motion to Dismiss for Mootness at 6, Tefel v. Reno, No. 97-0805-
CIV-KING (S.D. Fla. June 24, 1997) [hereinafter Supplement]. The motion contended
that under INA § 242(g), which had been enacted as part of IIRIRA, the district court had
no subject matter jurisdiction to consider the suit or to award plaintiffs any relief. See
Auguste v. Reno, 118 F.3d 723 (11th Cir. 1997).
68. Tefel v. Reno, 996 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
69. TRO Granted, supra note 66, at 825.
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action or inaction. 70 Following the Senate's passage of NACARA,
the plaintiff class amended the original complaint to rename the
class so as to add the Haitian immigrants to the class action.71
2. The Holding
The BIA in In re N-J-B- determined that the government
correctly interpreted the application of the new immigration
laws to the class members.72 The government argued that the
transitional rule provides that an OSC served at any time to an
alien in suspension of deportation proceedings interrupts
continuous physical presence for purposes of that hearing; 78
thus, an OSC was equivalent to a notice to appear under the new
law. The BIA held that under the transition rule, service of the
OSC ends the period of continuous presence prior to the
acquisition of the requisite seven years. 74 Therefore, according to
the BIA, an alien is ineligible for suspension of deportation even
though she applied before the enactment of IIRIRA in 1996.75
This was a draconian decision that would have affected many
Nicaraguans and other immigrants, except for the fact that
Tefel, through the enactment of NACARA, effectively changed
the immigration law.
3. A Criticism
There are three major points of criticism about the BIA
majority's decision in In re N-J-B-.76 First, the BIA's
interpretation ignores three important words: "notice to
appear."77 Pursuant to Section 240A(d)(1), an immigrant's
physical presence is terminated "when the alien is served with a
70. Tefel, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING at 65. However, appellants filed for an additional
thirty day extension of time within which to file their response to the Motion to Dismiss
for Mootness; see also Appellants' Motion For Second Extension, supra note 5, at 1.
71. Interview with Esther 0. Cruz, Managing Attorney of Florida Immigrant
Advocacy Center, in Miami, Fla. (July 16, 1997).
72. See generally In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. 3309 (BIA Feb. 20, 1997) (discussing the
currently vacated decision which interpreted the new immigration law against
respondents).
73. Id.
74. See In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. 3309 at 1 (BIA Feb. 20, 1997).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 28-39.
77. Id.
1998] 605
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
notice to appear under [Section] 239(a)," not an OSC. Second,
the majority's holding also ignores the difference between the
terms "Order to Show Cause" and "Notice to Appear."7 8 Third,
the majority further ignores the difference between "issuance" of
a charging document and "service" of a charging document.79
Fourth, the majority's decision implemented arbitrary
distinctions and inconsistencies.80 Therefore, the BIA majority's
interpretation of the new sections of the INA, a purely
administrative analysis, constituted statutory construction
which only the judiciary has the final authority to reject.8'
a. Section 240A(d)(1)
Five BIA members dissented in three separate dissenting
opinions.8 2 According to BIA Member Viflageliu, one of the
dissenters, the interruption of continuous physical presence
applies to all cancellation of removal applications, regardless of
how and when they were initiated, but does not apply to
suspension of deportation cases remaining in deportation
proceedings.8 3  Moreover, Villageliu also considered the
legislative history of the new law. 4 Initially, Congress included
language applying the interruption of physical presence to
deportation cases.8 5 However, the language was subsequently
deleted. 6 Villageliu clarified Congress' original intent:
[T]he interruption of continuous physical presence applies
only when an alien is placed in removal proceedings and seeks
cancellation of such removal under the new procedures. The
language "notice to appear issued before, on, and after
enactment" relied upon by the majority is merely a
jurisdictional provision precluding jurisdictional challenges
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) ("The question whether
Congress intended the two standards to be identical is a pure question of statutory
construction for the courts to decide.").
82. In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. 3309 at 36 (BIA Feb. 20, 1997).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 37.
85. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 41, at 13.
86. Id.
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when an alien is placed under the new removal
procedures .... 87
Villageliu's analysis challenges the BIA majority's
interpretation of Congress' intent by addressing the relevance of
statutory interpretation consistent with the Act's purpose in its
entirety.
b. "Order to Show Cause" and "Notice to Appear"
The BIA majority violated several basic principles of
statutory interpretation." In interpreting the phrase "notice to
appear under 239(a)" as surplusage, the BIA majority violated
the mandate that no statute may be read so as to render any
word or phrase surplusage.89 The BIA majority also violated the
canon that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used when it refused to give the word
"under" its ordinary meaning.90 The BIA majority further
violated the statutory canon that different words or phrases used
in the same statute have different meanings when it failed to
recognize that only notices to appear served under Section 239(a)
interrupt physical presence. 91 It also ignored the distinction
between the word "served" and the word "issued."92 Finally, the
BIA failed to construe ambiguities in favor of the alien.
93
c. "Issuance" and "Service" Distinguished
The majority overlooks the fact that Section 309(c)(5) states
that physical presence cut-off is triggered when a Notice to
Appear under Section 239(a) is "issued," rather than "served."
On the other hand, Section 240A(d)(1) uses the word "served"
with a notice to appear under Section 239(a). That statute says
87. In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. 3309 at 29 (BIA Feb. 20, 1997) (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988); U.S. v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528,
538-39 (1955); COIT Indep. Joint Venture v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S.
561 (1989) (asserting that statutory sections must be construed harmoniously so as to
give effect to each section).
90. INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984); Ardestani v. INS, 520 U.S. 129, 135
(1991).
91. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987).
92. In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. 3309 at 40 (BIA Feb. 20, 1997).
93. Id.
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"issued" in Section 309(c)(5) and "served" in Section 240A(d)(1),
indicating that Congress intended the transition rule to apply
only to cases where the government had issued an OSC before
September 30, 1996, but had not served it prior to that date.94
Thus, this would give effect to the "before" language of Section
309(c)(5).
d. Arbitrary Distinctions and Inconsistencies
Criticized
Class members also argued that the BIA decision is not
entitled to deference because it contradicts the government's
regulations and two of its own recent decisions. 95 The BIA
decision was both contradictory and inconsistent in several
regards. The BIA majority acknowledged that it was not until
IIRIRA that the INA referred to notice to appear.96 It also
recognized that in the past deportation proceedings commenced
with an OSC. s 7 Nevertheless, in its holding the BIA equates
both terms.
Furthermore, the BIA majority's holding and reasoning in
this case differed substantially from the holding in two other
recent BIA decisions.98 In In re Soriano, the BIA stressed that
"another basic rule of statutory construction instructs that no
provision of law should be so construed as to render a word or
clause surplusage."99 Yet, this is exactly what the BIA did.
Moreover, in In re Fuentes, the BIA followed canons of statutory
construction that it disregarded in this decision.1 0 As a result,
the class members criticized the internal inconsistencies in the
BIA's recent decisions, thereby discounting and challenging the
majority's deference in the In re N-J-B- ruling. 0 1 The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has, in recent cases, reversed
the BIA because the Board drew arbitrary distinctions between
two similarly situated groups of people. 0 2
94. Opening Brief, supra note 42, at 32.
95. In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. 3309 (BIA Feb. 20, 1997).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. In re Soriano, Int. Dec. 3289 (BIA June 2, 1996).
100. In re N-J-B-, Int. Dec. 3309 at 25 (BIA Feb. 20, 1997).
101. Id.
102. Acosta-Montero v. INS, 62 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 1995); Yeung v. INS, 61
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The Attorney General also remains a staunch critic of the
decision. 103 Her reaction to the decision was to certify the case to
herself and subsequently vacate it.104 Additionally, the Attorney
General placed great emphasis on the law's possible
ramifications if legislative proposals were not enacted. She
stated that "[we] want to ensure that the 1996 immigration law
will not have an unduly harsh effect on those individuals who
have made vital contributions to their local communities here in
the United States, while putting down deep roots in our nation
and abiding by our laws."'05 Moreover, the Attorney General
justified her actions by stating that she was, "[fulfilling] the
promise by President Clinton to find a fair and reasonable
solution for thousands of Central Americans and others whose
cases were pending when Congress changed the standard for
humanitarian relief from deportation....
III. TEFEL V. RENO
The federal judge held in favor of the class members in
Tefel. 1 7 The judge issued a temporary restraining order on May
14, 1997, barring the government from deporting thousands of
individuals under Section 309(c)(5) of IIRIRA. 10 8  The
government opposed the class members' request for a temporary
restraining order and sought to dismiss the complaint on
jurisdictional grounds from the outset.19 First, the government
argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Batanic v. INS, 12 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing
Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, 501 U.S. 680, 698 (1991) (asserting that as a general matter
the case for judicial deference is less compelling with respect to agency positions that are
inconsistent with previously held views); U.S. Mosaic v. NLRB, 935 F.2d 1249, 1255 n.7
(11th Cir. 1991) (finding that "agency inconsistency on a matter of statutory
interpretation, if not well articulated, would almost epitomize arbitrary agency action.").
103. Department of Justice, Administration Proposes Fine-tuning for 1996
Immigration Law to Mitigate Harsh Effects of Applying New Rules to Pending Cases 2
(June 10, 1997) (press release) [hereinafter Press Release].
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Reno Vacates N.J-B- Suspension Decision, Proposes Changes to 1996 Act, supra
note 7.
107. TRO Granted, supra note 66, at 825.
108. Id.
109. Petitioners' Reply to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Temporary
Restraining Order and in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 1, Tefel v. Reno,
No. 97-0805-CIV-KING (S.D. Fla. June 24, 1997) [hereinafter Petitioners' Reply].
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the suit because Section 242(g) of the INA bars the action. 110
Second, the government asserted that only the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit has jurisdiction to review final orders of
deportation.' Third, in the alternative, the government argued
that even if the Court had jurisdiction the class members failed
to demonstrate that they were entitled to a temporary
restraining order because they had not exhausted
administrative remedies.1 2 Presently, the jurisdictional issue is
on appeal. 113
A. The Government's Jurisdictional Challenge
IIRIRA changed the procedure for seeking judicial review in
the federal courts.1 4 INA Section 242 currently contained within
IIRIRA Section 306(a) repealed and replaced the old INA Section
106.115 The old INA Section 106 applies to final orders of
exclusion or deportation filed on or after the enactment of the
IIRIRA."1 6 Notably, under technical corrections, the new
provisions do not affect those persons in proceedings before
enactment of the IIRIRA.117 However, the government challenges
the interpretation of the judicial review section of the law.
The government's argument seeks to limit judicial review
to the federal courts.118 The government did not argue that the
class members' claim cannot be reviewed at all by the federal
courts. Instead, the government argued that exclusive judicial
review in the Court of Appeals is adequate.1 19 To make this
argument the government relied upon the language of INA
Section 242(g). This section provides for exclusive jurisdiction:
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.-Except as provided in this
section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Supplement, supra note 67, at 6.
114. IIRIRA § 306(a)(2) (former INA § 242 regarding deportation proceedings was
amended and renumbered INA § 240 "Removal Proceedings").
115. Id.
116. IIRIRA § 306(c)(1).
117. INTRODUCING THE 1996 IMMIGRATION REFORM Act 121, supra note 18.
118. See Petitioners' Reply, supra note 109, at 29.
119. Id.
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on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by
the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate
cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this
Act. 120
The government read this section of the law broadly so as to
virtually withdraw all jurisdiction from the federal courts. In
fact, the government claims that decisions made by lower level
officials constitute decisions of the Attorney General. 21
According to the court's interpretation, however, the plain
statutory language only precludes judicial review of "the decision
or action of the Attorney General."12 2 Although the Attorney
General may delegate her authority to lower level officials under
INA 103(a)(4), (a)(6), and (c), she is not authorized to determine
the extent of federal jurisdiction by delegation. 123 Otherwise, the
court would be permitting the Executive Branch to determine
the extent of federal jurisdiction, which is strictly prohibited
under Marbury v. Madison.124 Thus, the review of the decisions
or actions of lower level government officials is not precluded.
Therefore, the court accepted the class members' argument that
INA 242(g) does not preclude judicial review in the district court
because it only precludes review of direct decisions of the
Attorney General. 125
Moreover, the court determined that the government's
interpretation of the statutes would lead to a complete abolition
of judicial review for deportation cases commencing before April
1, 1997, and as a result, would raise serious constitutional
issues. 126 INA Section 242 expressly prohibits judicial review of
deportation orders "[e]xcept as provided in this section and
notwithstanding any other provision of law."' 27 The remainder of
INA Section 242 does not apply to deportation proceedings
initiated prior to April 1, 1997, which is the case here. 28 The
class members were in deportation proceedings prior to April 1,
120. INA § 242(g).
121. Petitioners' Reply, supra note 109, at 1.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 11.
124. Id. at 11.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 9.
127. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 13.
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1997; thus, the cases would be governed by the pre-Section 242
statutory scheme. 29
The government argues that the only exception to the
purported total bar to judicial review under Section 242(g) is
that set forth in former Section 106(a) of the INA.130 The
government unsuccessfully attempted to add the Section 106(a)
exception to the language of INA Section 242.131 According to the
court's interpretation, INA Section 242(g) simply does not
provide an exception for proceedings under INA Section 106
because Section 106 is repealed in the same section (IIRIRA
306(b)) that creates INA Section 242(g). 132 The court noted that
INA Section 106 does apply as the pre-existing law for
deportation review. 133  However, the court rejected the
government's argument that INA Section 106 should be read to
deny all district court review. 134
Additionally, the District Court noted that the class
members' estoppel and due process claims are matters that
cannot be addressed by an Immigration Judge (IJ) or the BIA.13 5
The government argued that the class members should pursue
their constitutional and nonconstitutional claims exclusively in
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upon receiving a
final order of deportation. 13 6 The IJs would have no jurisdiction
to hear these claims because a factual record could only be
developed in the district court. 8 7 Thus, the District Court-held
that former Section 106(a) cannot be construed to prohibit the
129. Id. The government argued that INA § 242(g) applies to deportation
proceedings because of § 306(c)(1) of IIRIRA which reads that § 242(g) "shall apply
without limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion,
deportation or removal proceedings under such Act." Id. However, the Court noted that
this provision goes not to the application of INA § 242(g) but to its 'Effective Date." Id.
Moreover, once the language of § 242(g) is applied, the language limits it to removal
proceedings. Id. Thus, the Court found that INA § 242(g) applies to proceedings that
began as exclusion or deportation proceedings but were changed into removal
proceedings under § 306(c)(3) ofIIRIRA. Id.
130. INA § 106(a) (providing that under the provision, "the sole and exclusive
procedure" to review "final orders of deportation" is in the court of appeals).
131. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 7, Tefel v. Reno, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING
(S.D. Fla. June 24, 1997).
132. Id.
-133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 8.
136. Id. at 10.
137. Id.
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district court from exercising its federal question jurisdiction. 13
The government subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit on jurisdictional grounds. 139 The class
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss for mootness.' 4° In the
motion, the government agreed that the Attorney General's
certification of the decision in In re N-J-B-, has had a profound
effect on the status of Tefel.' 4' Therefore, the government made
the case for the mootness of its own appeal.
B. Jurisdiction Unresolved
Despite the legislative reform of IIRIRA, the jurisdictional
issue remains unresolved. 42 In fact, the class members fied a
Supplement to Motion to Dismiss for Mootness with the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in an effort to circumvent
addressing the jurisdictional issue. 4 The precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit indicates that the court is likely to favor the
government's interpretation of INA Section 242(g) as posing a
complete bar to jurisdiction for any other court.144 This result
may require remanding the case to the District Court with
instruction to dissolve the injunction. 145
138. Id.
139. Supplement, supra note 67, at 1.
140. Id.
141. Id. In fact, the government stated that:
At present, the issues presented by the district court's decision are in flux.
The Attorney General has not yet decided N-J-B- after certifying the case [In
re N-J-B-] to herself, and it is not yet apparent when that decision will be
rendered or what its outcome will be. Whether the decision ultimately
affirms the BIA's decision in N-J-B- or reverses it, or affirms in part and
reverses in part, the decision will significantly aid the government in
identifying precisely for the Court what, if any, issues are appropriately
presented for appellate consideration....
Id
142. Id.
143. See Supplement to Motion to Dismiss for Mootness at 1, Tefel v. Reno, No. 97-
0805-CIV-KING (S.D. Fla. June 24, 1997); Interview with Esther 0. Cruz, Managing
Attorney of Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, in Miami, Fla. (Oct. 28, 1997).
144. Auguste v. Reno, 118 F.3d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1997).
145. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950); Duke Power Co. v.
Greenwood County, 299 U.S. 259, 267-68 (1936); Auguste v. Reno, 118 F.3d 723 (lth
Cir. 1997); Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1213-14 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 701 F.2d 653, 656, 658 (7th Cir. 1983);
Crowell v. Mader, 444 U.S. 505 (1980).
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The Eleventh Circuit has consistently held that it lacks
jurisdiction to hear appeals pursuant to IIRIRA. 14 In Auguste v.
Reno, the court held that judicial review could be precluded
because "no judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution" to
aliens.' 47 Thus, in order for the court to obtain jurisdiction, the
suit must have been brought directly to the district court. Under
this analysis, the court would hold that it did not have
jurisdiction under IIRIRA to hear the claim, completely barring
the class from asserting their constitutional claims. 148
C. Obtaining Preliminary Injunction
On June 24, 1997, U.S. District Judge King issued a
preliminary injunction preventing the deportation of tens of
thousands of individuals and preventing the government from
enforcing the BIA's decision in In re N-J-B-,149 which ultimately
impacts many immigrants throughout the nation. 150
The Court's decision established that the class members met
three of the four criteria required to obtain a preliminary
injunction. The four criteria are as follows: (1) the substantial
likelihood that they will prevail on the merits; (2) that a
preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable harm;
(3) that the threatened injury to the class members outweighs
the threatened harm the preliminary injunction would inflict on
146. Auguste, 118 F.3d at 727.
147. Id. at 727 (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952)); see also
Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352, 355 (1lth Cir. 1997).
148. One manner of circumventing the court's holding is to assert a habeas corpus
argument. No court, including the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, has
precluded review in habeas. To do so, would raise a serious constitutional question. If
the class members proceed on this basis, it is likely that the battle will be over the scope
of habeas. However, cases like Mbiya v. INS suggest that review is only available in rare
and unusual circumstances where there is a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." See
Mbiya v. INS, 930 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ga. 1996). As such, it is unlikely that such a
challenge may even come to the forefront.
149. Tefel v. Reno, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING at 64 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 1997).
150. The class members in In re N-J-B- consisted of:
All individuals within the states of Georgia, Alabama and Florida who have
been or will be denied suspension of deportation as a result of the BIA's
[Board of Immigration Appeals] decision to apply the transitional rule of
Section 309(c)(5) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) retroactively to persons who have sought or are
seeking suspension of deportation.
See Plaintiffs Complaint at 55, Tefel v. Reno, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING (S.D. Fla. June
24, 1997).
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the non-movant; and (4) that the preliminary injunction would
serve the public interest. 151
1. Likelihood of Prevailing
In contrast to a permanent injunction, a preliminary
injunction does not require the strict test of "success" on the
merits. 15 2 Thus, the class members were not required to present
the same breadth of evidence that is required for obtaining a
permanent injunction. 153  However, the government was
prevented from obtaining full discovery at the preliminary
injunction stage due to time constraints. 154
2. Necessary to Prevent Irreparable Harm
The purpose of a preliminary injunction must always be to
prevent irreparable injury. 155 In Tefel, the court held that the
class members would suffer substantial irreparable harm if an
injunction was not issued.15 6 Although the government was
given the opportunity to offer testimony of witnesses to rebut the
claim of irreparable harm, the government declined to do so.' 57
Instead, the government limited its challenge based on lack of
irreparable harm to numerous assertions and arguments. 58
Thus, the court accepted the class members' unrebutted
testimony and found that the class members met their burden of
proof.159
This was a critical decision because without the preliminary
injunction, many of the class members would certainly face
deportation. 160  This fear was a substantial factor at trial
resulting from the government's testimony, which indicated that
151. Tefel, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING at 18 (citing University of Texas v. Camenisch,
451 U.S. 390, 394 (1981)).
152. Tefel, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING at 18 (citing University of Texas v. Camenisch,
451 U.S. 390, 394 (1981)).
153. Tefel, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING at 18.
154. Id. at 14.
155. Id. at 60.
156. Id. at 64.
157. Id. at 59.
158. Id. at 59.
159. Id. at 59.
160. Id.
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they intended to proceed with their deportation policy, and with
executing any orders of deportation of class members with final
orders of deportation. 161  Furthermore, many of the class
members already have these orders of deportation; thus, they
would be directly affected by the government's policy decisions. 62
This fear of deportation affected class members in several
ways. 163 Notably, many Nicaraguan families' fear of deportation
resulted in parents not sending their children to school.164 The
Dade County School Board responded with a press release
addressing the Nicaraguan community's concerns. 16 5  This
response is indicative of the irreparable harm suffered by
Nicaraguan families during the course of Tefel.
In addition, many witnesses testified as to the panic and
fear of being deported expressed by Nicaraguan family members
to their priests and other community leaders on a regular
basis.166 Some Nicaraguans did not publicize the deaths of their
own family members in local newspapers or list their current
161. Id.
162. Id. One example of irreparable harm involving Nicaraguans affected by the N-
J.B- decision is the situation of a seventeen-year old girl who came to the United States
when she was seven years old. She lives in the United States with her mother, a lawful
permanent resident, and has no family in Nicaragua. She is an outstanding student at
the top of her graduating class at the University of Miami/Knight Center School of
Applied Technology. She has participated in extensive community involvement on behalf
of low income, inner city youth and has been a peer counselor at Regis House. She is an
active member of the Catholic Church. However, as a result of the N-J-B- decision, her
plans to attend college and go to medical school may never be accomplished. Hence, the
threat of physical removal from the United States is evidence of irreparable harm
suffered by the Nicaraguans in this case. See Memorandum from Joan Friedland and
Cheryl Little to the Staff at Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, Effect of N-J-B-
Decision, at 3-4 (June 1997) (on file with the University of Miami Inter-American Law
Review).
163. Tefel, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING at 46-64.
164. Demetrio Perez, Jr., Vice Chair, Dade County School Board, Demetrio Perez, Jr.
Asks School Board Colleagues For Solidarity With Nicaraguan Families (May 1, 1997)
(press release).
165. Id. Mr. Demetrio Perez, Jr., stated:
We cannot remain indifferent ... when the emotional stability of our students
is in danger. I think that we need to clarify - given the questions and
concerns which we have been made aware of - that at this time there is no
regulation in existence, which will remove Nicaraguan children from DCPS
[Dade County Public Schools] classrooms. I hope this will serve to eliminate
any doubts that many Nicaraguan families have expressed.
Id
166. Tefel, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING at 60.
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addresses in church registries for fear of being identified and
deported by the government. 167
Furthermore, many parents, fearing that the government
would identify them, refused to bring their children to the
hospital for medical attention.' 68 Many of the witnesses that
testified confirmed the fear and emotional hardship suffered by
Nicaraguan families and especially their children.
169
There are also many cases of children, who are citizens of
the United States, but who have Nicaraguan parents. 170 For
instance, one family, the Pettersons, have three children born in
the United States. 7' Two of the daughters, who are seven and
six years old, suffer from Argininemia, a rare form of cerebral
palsy. 172  One of the daughters was born blind. 7 3  The father
describes the other daughter at birth as, "just looked off into
space...doesn't walk,...didn't talk,...didn't move."'174  The only
form of treatment available for the younger child is found in the
United States and Canada. 175 The oldest daughter is fed through
a tube. 7 6 Also, both daughters receive treatment from an
orthopedic physician because neither of them can walk. 1
77
Deportation of the father, the sole financial provider, would
leave the children and mother homeless because they require the
mother's complete attention and care. 78
167. Id. at 46-64.
168. Id. at 60. In reflecting on these matters, the Director of the Human and Labor
Rights Institute at Florida International University, Haydee Marin, testified that for fear
of deportation a family refused to bring their child to a hospital for medical attention.
Subsequently, the child died. Id.
169. Id. For example, Maria Esperanza Vargas de Chavarria's daughter, who is now
seventeen years old, suffers from San Filliopo Down Syndrome. Id. at 46. The disease
will progress and eventually lead to her death. Id. at 46-47. The mother described the
disease as resulting in the bones starting to "turn and twist and crumble up" and
testified that her child will eventually stop speaking, understanding, moving, and
walking. Id. The mother testified that if an injunction is not issued, it would be fatal for
her child and would, in effect, be a "death sentence." Id. at 47.
170. Id. at 48.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 49.
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Medical conditions of these types require close, periodic
monitoring, which is impossible to provide to children in a
country like Nicaragua. Even assuming, arguendo, that the
children may stay in the United States, without the attention
and assistance of their parents the children's chances of recovery
are slim. It has been established through empirical evidence
that factors in the social environment exert a major and
potentially modifiable influence on the health of populations.179
Economically, the class members also suffered irreparable
harm. 8 0 The government, at the time of the trial, had a policy
that denied class members a work permit once their case was
dismissed on the basis of In re N-J-B-.18 ' In McNary v. Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc., the Court stated that "[e]ven disregarding
the risk of deportation, the impact of a denial of the opportunity
to obtain gainful employment is plainly sufficient to mandate
constitutionally fair procedures in the application process."1
8 2
Thus, the denial of work permit authorizations constituted
economic hardship and irreparable harm to the class
members. 183
Dade County will also be affected. In fact, Judge King's
opinion emphasized that "[a]n application of the law as presently
interpreted in N-J-B- would negatively affect Dade County, and
particularly, the City of Sweetwater, economically as well as
emotionally." 8 4 Moreover, one Dade County official testifiedthat
there would be an approximate $1 billion loss in revenue to Dade
County if class members were deported.'8 5
However, the cornerstone of an "irreparable" injury for
purposes of a preliminary injunction is the prerequisite that the
injury cannot be undone through monetary remedies. 8 6
Certainly, the injuries suffered by the class members in this case
cannot be undone by monetary relief. The class members are
prevented from obtaining lawful permanent resident status.8 7
179. Timothy G. Evans, Book Review, 1 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 205 (1995).
180. Tefel, No-97-0805-CIV-KING at 63.
181. Id.
182. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 491 (1991).
183. Tefel, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING at 63.
184. Judge Issues Preliminary Injunction in Suspension of Deportation Case, 74
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1029, 1032 (June 7, 1997).
185. Id. at 1032.
186. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 694 F. Supp. 864, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
187. Tefel, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING at 60-61.
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They are prevented from the right to accrue time toward
citizenship, the ability to petition for family members, and to be
free from government deportation proceedings. 88 These injuries
bespeak irreparable harm.
3. Balancing Harm to Class Members Against Harm to
Government
The court also considered the third prong of the test for
obtaining a preliminary injunction-balancing the harm to class
members against the harm to government. 89 The government
asserted that "...the granting of a preliminary injunction would
interfere with the federal government's ability to control the flow
of immigration and... the ability of the Executive Office of
Immigration Review to effectively process the cases within its
jurisdiction." 190 Instead, the court found that the administrative
inconvenience the government may sustain as a result of issuing
a preliminary injunction did not outweigh the serious and
substantial irreparable harm to the thousands of class
members. 191
4. Public Interest
*The class members were easily able to meet the fourth
prong's requirement that entering a preliminary injunction
would serve the public interest.192 State Representative Jorge
Rodriguez Chomat, attorney and state representative for District
114 of the state of Florida, testified that the Nicaraguan
community of Sweetwater is becoming increasingly concerned
and worried about the effects of deportation on their
community.193 Chomat further testified that parents were fearful
that they would be deported to Nicaragua and forced to abandon
their United States citizen children.194 The court found this
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 61-62.
193. Id. at 62.
194. Id.
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testimony sufficient to prove that the preliminary injunction
would serve the public interest.' 9
D. Violation of Due Process and Equal Protection
Rights Under the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution
The Tefel class members claimed that they were deprived of
their constitutional due process and equal protection rights
under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. 196 Deportable
aliens have long been recognized as having full due process
rights.197 The Tefel class members had a property interest in
obtaining a hearing on their application. 198 The BIA majority's
decision violated the class members' rights since they were
deprived of their property interest without due process. 199
It was argued that the BIA did not notify class members
that the Board was considering applying the new statutes in
Baldizon's case.200 As a result, the BIA's failure to give class
members' counsel the opportunity to address these issues before
making its decision constitutes a denial of Baldizon's right to
counsel. 20 1 The right to counsel is fundamental in immigration
proceedings. 20 2 Thus, in Tefel, it was a violation of due process
195. Id.
196. Id. at 26.
197. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Ibrahim v. United States INS, 821 F.2d
1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1987).
198. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 425 (1982) (holding that where an
individual was ordered deported on a misconstruction of the term "affiliation" as used in
the statute and by reason of an unfair hearing of the question of his membership in the
Communist Party, his detention under warrant is unlawful); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (standing for the proposition that notice to
beneficiaries on judicial settlement of accounts by the trustee of a common trust fund is a
proceeding where individuals may be deprived of property rights and, hence, notice and
hearing must measure up to the standards of due process); see also Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (stating that "when protected interests are implicated, the
right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount."); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976) (indicating that prior to the termination of Social Security benefits, administrative
procedures are required in order to protect property interests).
199. Tefel, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING at 5.
200. Interview with Ira J. Kurzban, supra note 4.
201. Id.
202. Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that violation of right
to counsel does not require further showing of prejudice); Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d
859, 862 (9th Cir. 1985) (asserting that due process guarantees right to counsel of choice);
see also Partible v. INS, 600 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1979).
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not to permit counsel for the class members to address the
issues.
Moreover, the distinctions drawn between the class
members and others seeking suspension of deportation violate
the equal protection guarantees of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.20 3 Specifically, individuals
who came forward to the government and who were placed in
deportation proceedings before being present for seven years,
who had their hearing after seven years and were granted
suspension of deportation, are punished under the In re N-J-B-
decision. 204 Conversely, immigrants who evaded the government
for seven years are still eligible for suspension of deportation.
205
The government argues that this distinction is
constitutional; Congress has extraordinarily broad power to
draw distinctions between aliens "that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens. ' 206 Therefore, Congress is said to make the
same kinds of distinctions in NACARA that were made under
Fiallo. As such, the Supreme Court has been deferential to the
plenary power of Congress over political matters.
A comparison of the distinctions accorded in Fiallo and those
under NACARA suggests distinctions among immigrants are
constitutional. 207 The Supreme Court in Fiallo held it was
constitutional under the INA for Congress to exclude preferential
treatment as a parent to natural fathers (U.S. citizens) of
illegitimate children.20 The distinction between Fiallo and
NACARA is immigration status. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Marshall, clearly distinguishes Fiallo from most other
immigration cases in that Fiallo involved the rights of citizens.2°9
However, it can be argued that NACARA involves the rights of
203. Tefel, No. 97-0805-CIV-KING at 35-36.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Defendants' Reply To Plaintiffs' Response To Defendants' Motion To
Dissolve Injunction, Motion To Dismiss As Moot As To Certain Class Members, and
Motion For Summary Judgment As To The Remaining Class at 8, Tefel v. Reno, No. 97-
0805-CIV-KING (S.D. Fla. June 24, 1997) [hereinafter Defendants' Reply]; see also Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1976); Boutilier v.
INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967).
207. For a complete summary of the distinctions and effect of NACARA, see
Appellants' Motion For Second Extension, supra note 5, at 3.
208. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
209. Id. at 805.
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immigrants. Thus, the Court may interpret NACARA in this
light effectively limiting constitutional protection to immigrants
alike.
In Fiallo, the court held that the statutory scheme should be
upheld so long as it is based upon any "facially legitimate and
bona fide reason. 210 The minimal standard of review instills in
the government no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the
rationality of a statutory classification.211 Similarly, in the Tefel
appeal, the government will argue that Congress, pursuant to
NACARA, made a decision regarding which aliens would qualify
for suspension of deportation. 212 Thus, NACARA is facially
legitimate. 213 It further argues that the class members cannot
succeed on a constitutional challenge to the stop-time provision
of IIRIRA Section 309(c)(5)(A), as amended by NACARA Section
203(a)(1).
E. Policy Considerations
The Attorney General announced her efforts to ameliorate
the harsh effects caused by application of the new immigration
laws to the class members. 214 The general rule that governs
which law applies to individuals who are not citizens in removal
proceedings is that anyone in proceedings before April 1, 1997,
may be charged only under the old grounds of deportation or
exclusion. In In re N-J-B-, the government interpreted the filing
of an OSC as satisfying this requirement. However, the
exception to the general rule is found in the power granted to the
Attorney General under IIRIRA. 215 Under the new immigration
regulations, the Attorney General retains the sole authority to
terminate and reinitiate proceedings. 216 The Attorney General
announced her concern about ensuring a fair transition to the
new tighter rules applicable to the relief from deportation known
formerly as suspension of deportation. 217  As a result, the
210. See Defendants' Reply, supra note 205, at 9.
211. 8 C.F.R. § 240.16 (1997); see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993).
212. Defendants' Reply, supra note 205, at 46.
213. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. at 795.
214. Press Release, supra note 103.
215. IIRIRA § 309(c)(3).
216. 8 C.F.R. § 240.16 (1997).
217. Reno Vacates N-J-B- Suspension Decision, Proposes Changes to 1996 Act, supra
note 7, at 1073.
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Attorney General vacated and is reviewing the decision of the
BIA in In re N-J-B-.218
In addition, the Attorney General announced that the
Clinton Administration would be proposing amendments to the
legislature. The amendments to the INA would allow those
whose cases were already filed the opportunity to seek
suspension under the standards that applied before the 1996
immigration reform law took effect, thereby eliminating unfair
application of the new rules governing suspension-type relief to
cases in proceedings before April 1, 1997.219 These transitional
cases would be exempted from the stop-time rule, which provides
that the accrual of necessary time in the U.S. stops when a
charging document is served.220 Also, these transitional cases
would be exempted from the new 4000 yearly cap on grants of
suspension-type relief.22 1
Significantly, the Attorney General warned that if these
legislative proposals were not enacted, the Administration would
consider administrative options.222 Among the administrative
options mentioned is the Deferred Enforced Departure, which
would protect from deportation nationals of El Salvador or
Guatemala who would have been eligible for suspension but for
the new rules. 223 Moreover, the press release announcing the
Attorney General's decision to vacate In re N-J-B- indicated that
under the proposed legislation, the Immigration Reform
Transition Act of 1997 will ensure that deserving requests for
suspension, including those by certain battered spouses and
children filed before April 1, will not be denied because of the
4000 case cap. 224
In Tefel, the government appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit. The class members filed a Motion to
Stay. However, both are pending until Attorney General Janet
Reno makes a decision on In re N-J-B- or until Congress takes
action.225 In the meantime, IJs made judgments on the issue at
218. id. at 1072.
219. Id. at 1072.
220. Id. at 1072.
221. Id. at 1072.
222. Id. at 1073.
223. Id. at 1073.
224. Id. at 1072.
225. Interview with Esther 0. Cruz, supra note 71.
1998]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
their discretion because the vacation is equivalent to having no
precedent in the area. 226 As a result, the government may
appeal any decision made by the IJs.227
Generally, immigration advocates responded positively to
the Attorney General's actions.228 According to Angela Kelly,
Director of Policy for the National Immigration Forum in
Washington, D.C., the proposals "will help to keep families
together, promote stability in Central America, and restore a
measure of fairness for those who almost had the rug pulled out
from under them."229
There was some immediate progress as indicated by the
Clinton administration's decision to consider the new proposals
to the immigration reform laws. On July 29, 1997, three United
States Senators, Connie Mack, Bob Graham, and Ted Kennedy,
presented the proposed legislation to Congress. 230 According to
Chris Hand, spokesperson for Graham, the project is the same as
the proposal sent the week of July 22nd by President Bill Clinton
to Congress. 22 1 President Clinton made it clear that he would
apply administrative solutions if the Senate and House of
Representatives were not in accord over the new proposals. 232
The proposals were debated and discussed on September 1997.
The road to reforming IIRIRA has not been paved completely
with good intentions. Although Nicaraguans and Cubans
received amnesty, similarly situated Haitians and other Central
Americans were not equally recognized on the bill.233 In fact,
from its inception, there were many critics of the proposed
legislation.234 Even Haitian President Rene Pr6val plead with
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Reno Vacates N-J-B- Suspension Decision, Proposes Changes to 1996 Act, supra
note 7, at 1073.
229. Id.
230. Mabell Dieppa, Presentan proyecto a favor de los nicas [Project Presented in
Favor of Nicas], NuEvo HERALD, July 30, 1997, at 3A-
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Carol Rosenberg & Maria Travierso, Bill signing lets immigrants breathe free,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 20, 1997, at 1A.
234. See Letter from Carrie P. Meek, member of Congress, to President Clinton
(Nov. 5, 1997). Mr. Meek considers that the issue of equal relief provided to Haitians is
"the single most important immigration issue affecting people of color. It is extremely
important to me and to other members of the Congressional Black Caucus." Id.
Moreover, in this letter Mr. Meek requests that the 14,000 Haitians similarly situated
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President Clinton for equal treatment of Haitian immigrants, 235
indicating that repatriation would exacerbate the political and
economic conditions in Haiti.23 6 In response, President Clinton
assured that administrative relief would be provided to
Haitians.237 The relief would be in the form of staying their
deportation and deferred enforced departure, which would allow
many Haitians to cancel their deportation/exclusion proceedings
and receive work permits while Congress considers other
legislation on this issue. 238
IV. CONCLUSION
The interaction between IIRIRA and NACARA suggests that
the current approach to resolving the adjustment of status of
immigrants has not been resolved due to two issues. First,
NACARA fails to address similarly situated immigrants by
omitting them from those eligible to obtain relief under the
legislation. Second, the government argues that only the federal
courts had jurisdiction under IIRIRA to originally bring this
claim to the court system.
NACARA is deceptive on its face. It is ideological in nature
because it favors only Nicaraguans, Cubans, and a number of
Europeans to the exclusion of other groups similarly situated.
Thus, it is contrary to the non-ideological framework of other
immigration legislation including the Refugee Act of 1980.239
Therefore, it can be argued that as such the law is likely to
inflame the divisiveness among immigrants and perpetrate
should, "receive exactly the same amnesty relief that Nicaraguans would get." Id. He
advocates that promoting equal treatment of Haitians will prevent reliving the mistakes
of the past. Id.
235. See Letter from Rene Pr6val, President of Haiti, to President Clinton (Nov. 6,
1997). In the letter, President Pr6val states:
We recognize the importance of equal treatment for our citizens abroad as I
know you recognize the current economic and political situation in my
country ... [we] hope that you will ensure that Haitians who are currently in
the United States will be given the same status as that accorded Nicaraguan
citizens in the legislation currently proposed in Congress.
Id.
236. Id.
237. Interview with Esther 0. Cruz, Managing Attorney of Florida Immigrant
Advocacy Center in Miami, Fla. (Nov. 18, 1997).
238. Id.
239. Interview with Joan Friedland, Attorney of Florida Immigrant Advocacy
Center, in Miami, Fla. (Nov. 13, 1997).
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discriminatory practices. The trend of immigrant bashing is
likely to solidify during 1998 since it is an election year.
Additionally, the precedent at the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit is indicative that the challenge may fail on the
jurisdictional argument.240 While NACARA remains implicitly
deceptive, it may, ironically, represent for the legislature the last
token of equality extended to immigrants in the United States
for some time.
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